Challenge-Based Acquisition: Stimulating Innovative Solutions Faster and Cheaper by Asking the Right Questions by Weatherly, Richard et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2013-04-01
Challenge-Based Acquisition:
Stimulating Innovative Solutions Faster
and Cheaper by Asking the Right Questions
Weatherly, Richard


















Challenge-Based Acquisition: Stimulating 
Innovative Solutions Faster and Cheaper by 
Asking the Right Questions 
Richard Weatherly, Virginia Wydler, Matthew D. Way,  
Scott Anderson, and Michael Arendt 
MITRE Corporation 
Published April 1, 2013 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943. 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy 






The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research Program 
of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print 
additional copies of reports, please contact any of the staff listed on the Acquisition 
Research Program website (www.acquisitionresearch.net). 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=i - 
=
Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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Challenge-Based Acquisition: Stimulating Innovative 
Solutions Faster and Cheaper by Asking the Right 
Questions1 
Richard Weatherly—Weatherly (PhD) is director of robotics and advanced computing at The MITRE 
Corporation. With over 25 years of software design, development, and project leadership experience, 
he has been instrumental in bringing the technology of military simulation interoperability from 
concept through production to standardization. He is a published author and has led significant 
software projects, such as MITRE’s 2005 DARPA Grand Challenge entry. He holds a PhD in 
electrical engineering from Clemson University. [weather@mitre.org] 
Virginia Wydler—Wydler is a principal analyst at The MITRE Corporation. She has more than 25 
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Corporation. She holds an MS in national security strategy, Industrial College of the Armed Forces; 
an MS in acquisition and contracting, Naval Postgraduate School; and a BS in business 
administration, University of Maryland. She is a Certified Professional Contracts Manager and a 
Fellow of the National Contract Management Association. She is certified DAWIA Level III in 
contracting. [vwydler@mitre.org] 
Matthew D. Way—Mr. Way is a program integrator in the JIEDDO Defeat the Device Branch. Mr. 
Way served in the U.S. Army as a logistics officer, completing two tours in Operation Enduring 
Freedom and a third tour in Afghanistan as a company commander in the Georgia Army National 
Guard. He is a three-time Bronze Star recipient. After his military service, he worked in program 
management in the IT industry before joining the civil service. He is a graduate of the U.S. Merchant 
Marine Academy with a BS in maritime operations and technology. [matthew.way@jieddo.mil] 
Scott Anderson—Anderson (USN, Ret.) is director for acquisition integration at The MITRE 
Corporation. Prior to joining MITRE, he served 26 years in the U.S. Navy as a P-3 patrol plane pilot, 
Navy test pilot, systems engineer, and major program manager. He graduated from the U. S. Naval 
Academy in aeronautical engineering and received a Master of Aeronautical Engineering from the 
Naval Postgraduate School. He has flown 3,000+ hours in 24 aircraft types and is qualified DAWIA 
Level III in test and evaluation, systems planning research development and engineering, and 
program management.IA Level III in contracting. [canderson@mitre.org] 
Michael Arendt—Arendt (PhD) is a program management/acquisition lead at The MITRE 
Corporation. He joined the Acquisition Management Department of MITRE’s Center for Connected 
Government in 2013 and currently supports MITRE’s ChBA Capstone effort. From 2010 to 2013 he 
was a senior technology strategy consultant in IBM’s Public Sector Strategy and Innovation practice. 
From 2008 to 2010 he was an appointed member of the research faculty at the University of 
Maryland’s Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise. He holds a PhD in policy studies from the 
University of Maryland School of Public Policy. [marendt@mitre.org]  
                                                
1 Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. MITRE Public Release No: 12-3566 
The views, opinions and/or findings contained in this report are those of The MITRE Corporation and 
should not be construed as an official Government position, policy, or decision, unless designated by 
other documentation. © 2013 The MITRE Corporation. All Rights Reserved. 
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Abstract 
Budget reductions will require the Department of Defense (DoD) to make difficult decisions 
on how to invest limited resources and make current programs more affordable. Traditional 
acquisition methods are lengthy, serial, gate-like processes, built around stringent 
specifications and arms-length relationships. By contrast, Challenge-Based Acquisition 
(ChBA) utilizes transparent, accessible, concrete challenges to satisfy warfighter needs and 
stimulate industry innovation. Challenges enable DoD programs to assess actual 
performance against clearly defined mission objectives and create incentives for industry to 
innovate. ChBA thus offers a more transparent approach to fielding new capabilities, 
upgrades, and enhancements to existing systems. 
Mandate for Change 
It’s time to fundamentally change the way that we do business in Washington. To 
help build a new foundation for the 21st century, we need to reform our government so that 
it is more efficient, more transparent, and more creative. That will demand new thinking and 
a new sense of responsibility for every dollar that is spent. 
– President Barack Obama (2009) 
Fewer than half of the programs in the Department of Defense (DoD) Major Defense 
Acquisition portfolio have met established metrics for cost or performance (GAO, 2011a). 
Even worse, the DoD has canceled entire programs for cost overruns under the Nunn-
McCurdy Amendment after investing billions of dollars that could have been used elsewhere 
across the department (GAO, 2011b). According to the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), 50 of 74 breaches involved engineering design issues discovered after production 
had begun.  
Traditional DoD acquisition follows a lengthy, serial process based upon a plethora 
of documentation as required by the DoD 5000 Series of Instructions and Directives (DoD, 
2003b) as well as numerous Service-specific acquisition guidelines. In these documents, 
mission needs become program requirements, which are then quantified as performance 
parameters, defined as system attributes, tracked through derived technical performance 
measures, and included in a government/industry exchange of system specifications. Along 
this serial path, the linkage of program requirements to mission performance typically 
becomes unclear and often inaccurate. Alternatively, in some cases, system specifications 
become far too rigid and detailed, thus stifling opportunities for innovation. Despite best 
efforts by programs to mitigate risk through verification and validation using the systems 
engineering process, even a perfectly executed program can still produce a quality product 
that is often “late to the fight,” operationally ineffective, or unsuitable even if it addresses the 
original mission need.  
Furthermore, most contracts are awarded using government source selection 
evaluations based on industry paper proposals rather than “actual” product performance. 
This creates an incentive for industry to produce flawless documents with highly optimistic 
cost, schedule, and performance projections that meet or exceed every requirement in the 
government’s request. As a result, performance during program execution often falls short of 
the government’s expectations and cost and schedule overruns become nearly inevitable. 
These unrealistic proposals become particularly problematic when there is little prospect for 
additional competition throughout the acquisition life cycle, which may lock the program into 
a single solution and provider.  
The resulting disappointment creates an arms-length relationship between the 
contractor and the government, limiting trust, communication, and transparency. This can be 
particularly problematic given the long life cycle of many defense acquisition programs. The 
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impact of this tense relationship can raise costs related to bidding and negotiating contracts 
and slow the process of coming to acceptable terms and conditions (Crook, Ketchen, 
Combs, & Patterson, 2012). For example, a recent study concluded that the DoD currently 
spends roughly $400 billion each year acquiring products and services from its contractors, 
with about $100 billion of that amount spent on administrative costs alone. By cutting 
unneeded bureaucracy, defense officials could reduce the department’s costs by 20%—or 
roughly $20 billion each year (Weigelt, 2012).  
The complexity of traditional DoD acquisition makes the process difficult for 
programs with tight budgets or timelines to execute predictably, and virtually impossible to 
execute when trying to meet an urgent operational need. Given this situation, how can the 
DoD acquire capabilities both faster and better? The answer includes expressing 
requirements in terms of general capabilities rather than firm specifications and encouraging 
industry to respond with applicable product development and innovation that demonstrates 
best-of-breed solutions. 
This paper suggests Challenge-based Acquisition (ChBA) as an approach that could 
be applied to urgent need situations, could be executed in a more rapid, transparent 
manner, and would allow program stakeholders to satisfy mission needs. ChBA presents 
challenges to a set of interested parties, communicates government needs to the private 
sector, and encourages the creation of innovative products. The challenges are expressed 
in terms of specific capability criteria that must be satisfied, with the proposed solutions 
proven by evidence of performance. The ChBA approach leverages practices designed for a 
rapidly evolving technology environment and meets the real demands of users in the field. It 
applies acquisition practices and techniques necessary to achieve better outcomes in DoD 
programs and projects. ChBA is founded on the codification of government needs 
expressed as concrete performance outcomes. These outcomes are challenges that are 
issued to a marketplace of competing vendors, rather than needs expressed in paper 
specification documents that are addressed with unproven paper proposals.  
Background 
End users have difficulty imagining transformational or inventive solutions when they 
have a working solution at hand. Soldiers, for example, are good at improvising solutions to 
address shortcomings of equipment, and using whatever they can find on the battlefield. 
Similarly, they are experts at assessing the likely success of incremental improvements to 
devices and techniques. It is hard, however, to extend this innovation beyond the readily 
conceivable.  
Henry Ford supposedly said, “If I had asked people what they wanted, they would 
have said ‘faster horses’” (Ford, 2006). More recently, Steve Jobs said, “You can’t just ask 
customers what they want and then try to give that to them. By the time you get it built, 
they’ll want something new” (Burlingham & Gendron, 1989). Even the brightest equestrians 
would have had trouble picturing the utility of the Model T. While soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen are indeed the right individuals to define mission requirements, involving them in the 
specification process can limit the inventiveness of potential solutions.  
But suppose that Henry Ford had heard, “I want to get to my destination faster and 
with comfort and affordability.” In this case, the users would have issued a concrete mission 
challenge—get there faster with comfort—rather than a specified solution—a faster horse. 
Unfortunately, government acquisition agents, like Ford’s public, rarely think in terms of 
mission challenges and instead think in terms of tighter specifications to define solutions. 
As early as the 1980s, the DoD recognized that relying on highly rigid specifications 
can be burdensome and costly. Even in the unusual cases where specifications and 
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standards are perfect, premature application, over-application, and inappropriate application 
of standards could still cause complex problems (Bergman, 1996, p. 32). The DoD enacted 
acquisition reforms, deleting many military specifications from contracts, and emphasizing 
outcome and performance-based acquisitions (Bergman, 1996).  
Challenges present an option for achieving these goals. Governments and industry 
have long used challenges to spur technology advances in areas that include agriculture, 
aviation, energy, medicine, and navigation. For example, in 1714, an Act of Parliament 
established the British Longitude Prize (Princeton University, n.d.). The Longitude Board, 
which administered the prize, did not fund technical research but simply promised monetary 
awards based on the accuracy of proven results: £10,000 for 60 nautical miles of accuracy, 
£15,000 for 40 nautical miles, and £20,000 for 30 nautical miles. The prize prompted 
development of the maritime chronometer, which revolutionized global navigation and 
solved a problem that had bedeviled seafaring nations for over 150 years. 
The Wright Brothers’ contract with the U. S. Army (Smithsonian, National Air and 
Space Museum, n.d.) serves as a 20th century example of ChBA. As a result of their 
airplane’s performance in the 1909 U.S. Army flight trials, they received a contract that 
strongly incentivized speed, with a 10% bonus for every full mile per hour above 40. The 
average speed of the Wrights’ aircraft was 42.5 miles per hour, earning the inventors a 
$5,000 bonus and bringing the final purchase price of the airplane to $30,000. 
For decades, the aviation industry continued to create ChBA-like opportunities. 
When aircraft operators abstracted away the details of engine design and simply challenged 
power plant makers to deliver performance in terms of thrust, weight, and efficiency, General 
Electric’s Jack Welch conceived the idea of performance-based logistics. He sold “power by 
the hour” (Knowledge@Wharton, 2007), which relieved aircraft owners of the need to 
inventory, maintain, and repair engines. As a result, the costs of engine inventories, 
maintenance, and repair declined dramatically. 
More recently, the defense and aerospace industries have used challenges to 
support innovative technology development in areas of information technology (IT), space 
transportation, and military combat systems, as illustrated by the following examples.  
Space Transportation. In 2004 Space Ship One, a suborbital air-launched space 
plane, won the U.S. $10 million Ansari X Prize by completing the first manned private space 
flight. Space Exploration Technologies Corporation, also known as SpaceX, made history on 
May 25, 2012, as the world's first privately held company to send a cargo payload, carried 
on the Dragon spacecraft, to the International Space Station (SpaceX Corporation, n.d.). 
Military Combat Systems. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles are 
a family of armored fighting vehicles originally designed under the guidance of the U.S. 
Marine Corps to survive attacks and ambushes involving improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs). On July 31, 2007, the Marine Corps Systems Command launched MRAP II pre-
solicitation, challenging bidders to develop a new vehicle that offered a higher level of 
protection than the current MRAP vehicles. The U.S. Army Research Laboratory ensured 
the technologies used in the Frag Kit 6 (Fullerlove, 2009) armor upgrade project would be 
available to MRAP II designers. Initial testing at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds disqualified 
vehicles that did not meet requirements; the design run-off identified two vendors whose 
vehicles could pass the demonstration test. 
Information Technology. The federal and commercial markets have taken 
advantage of the highly competitive, fast-paced environment of IT. Most software 
manufacturers must prove that their software works within an environment and that it can 
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integrate into a larger system. Commercial manufacturers often provide free demonstrations 
at trade shows and tabletop exercises. To incorporate vendor solutions into its Network 
Integration Evaluation (NIE) program, the Army conducts semiannual events that bring 
together three Army communities to evaluate militarily useful technologies in both laboratory 
and field environments. The Army applies the Agile Process to accelerate the identification, 
testing, and fielding of relevant networked and non-networked capabilities to the soldier, in 
concert with capability set fielding and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle.  
The government has also set up programs specifically designed to make use of 
challenges. In addition to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s well-known 
Grand (DARPA, 2004) and Urban (DARPA, 2008) Challenges, they include the efforts 
summarized in the following section. 
Defense Acquisition Challenge (DAC) Program. The DAC program (Defense 
Acquisition Challenge [DAC] Program, 2012, § 2359b) annually solicits technology 
proposals from small- and medium-sized enterprises. The proposals present technologies 
that could lead to improvements in performance, affordability, manufacturing, or operational 
capability if introduced into existing acquisition programs (DAC Program, 2012, § 2359b). 
The new technologies should replace or augment some aspect of a current procurement 
and must be ready off the shelf. The DAC offers a promising way to encourage innovation 
and help new companies break into the defense market. However, it centers only on 
improvements to existing, conventional acquisition programs. Ironically, the DAC impels 
these programs to expend significant resources in order to expose opportunities for 
innovation that, if successful, will render parts of the original acquisition redundant. In a 
sense, the DAC represents an example of ChBA in which the challenges are not explicitly 
designed by the government but inferred by industry from existing, specification-based 
acquisitions. However, ChBA has the advantage of permitting entirely fresh approaches and 
avoids forcing industry to accept the constraints of an ongoing acquisition. 
Defense Innovation Marketplace. The Defense Innovation Marketplace serves as a 
centralized resource to help both government and industry “reinvigorate innovation” and 
fosters collaboration and communication between government and industry beyond 
traditional Requests for Information and Industry Days. The program allows industry to learn 
about the DoD’s investment priorities and capability needs, and to submit summary reports 
on proprietary Independent Research and Development (IR&D) to potential customers. For 
the government, the Defense Innovation Marketplace functions as a one-stop shop for DoD 
science and technology planning, acquisition resources, funding, and financial information 
by providing agencies with search tools to access and leverage industry technology projects 
(DoD, 2013).  
Challenge.gov. Outside the DoD, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has 
established the www.Challenge.Gov website, which helps individuals and companies to 
compete for prizes offered by various government agencies for solving some of their 
toughest problems. The website supports the “OMB Guidance Memo on the Use of 
Challenges and Prizes to Promote Open Government,” dated March 2010. That 
memorandum responded to the President’s Directive on Transparency and Open 
Government, which tasked the OMB Deputy Director for Management with issuing guidance 
for the increased use of challenges and prizes to develop new tools and approaches to 
improve open government. OMB launched the website in 2011 with 17 different agencies 
posting challenges with prizes, including a recent VA $3 million prize. A progress report 
published by the White House Office of Science and Technology stated that prizes may be 
effective in stimulating solutions to government problems (White House Office of Science 
and Technology Policy, 2012). 
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ChBA Attributes and Benefits 
ChBA creates an efficient division of labor where the government focuses on what it 
needs (i.e., demand) to achieve its mission and private industry focuses on solutions (i.e., 
supply). The government could use ChBA to communicate its needs by framing challenges 
that are analogous or identical to the desired capability. Industry could then respond to the 
challenges without being confined by extraneous constraints such as highly detailed 
engineering specifications.  
To meet government needs, the challenges must be transparent and 
understandable. If possible, the government should make the challenge accessible to all 
parties wishing to address the stated needs. Concrete challenges can permit nuanced levels 
of control in acquisition not possible with static specifications alone.  
As shown in Table 1, the DoD can derive several benefits from applying ChBA in its 
acquisitions. They include expanding user involvement, leveraging technology, reducing risk 
through proof of delivery rather than paper-based proposals, accommodating the full life 
cycle of a fielded system or product, utilizing the most appropriate contracting methods, and 
engaging industry to obtain competitive advantage. 
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 Acquisition Considerations, ChBA Compatibility, and Benefits 
 
Law, Regulations, Policy, and Guidance 
Recent acquisition laws, regulations, and policies emphasize the need to invest in 
design development and prototyping to mitigate performance risk and cost growth in DoD 
acquisitions. In the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 (Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2009), Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to ensure that 
the acquisition strategy for each major defense acquisition program includes requirements 
to demonstrate capabilities using competitive prototypes, and that programs consider 
appropriate trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives before 
development begins. 
Likewise, the Federal Acquisition System fully supports acquisition challenges, as 
indicated by the guiding principles in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR 1.102). 
Specifically, federal acquisitions must satisfy customer needs in terms of cost, quality, and 
timeliness of the delivered product or service by 
Acquisition Priority ChBA Attribute ChBA Benefits 
Urgent Warfighter 
Mission Needs / 
Accelerated 
Fielding Timeline 
ChBA is well suited to meeting urgent 
and  high-priority requirements. These 
needs are often very specific and 
amenable to description as acquisition 
challenges. Additionally, the urgency 
of the need relaxes most of the DoD 
Instruction 5000.02 constraints. (FAR 
6.302-2 Urgent and Compelling Need). 
ChBA allows rapid development of 
advanced technology, including both 
military and commercial variants. It can 
result in fielding the correct solution the 
first time, and avoiding additional costs of 
rework and schedule slippage—ideal for 




By definition, ChBA requires vendors 
to offer mature technology in order to 
participate in a challenge event.  
ChBA allows new functionality and 
interoperability to be tested in a 
concurrent environment, ensuring a more 
operationally ready product and thus 
reducing testing costs and timelines. 
System Life-Cycle 
Support / Upgrade 
Considerations 
ChBA is best suited for technology-
intensive acquisitions, which are likely 
to be short lived given the rapid pace of 
technology evolution.  
ChBA fits well into short-duration 
programs, where constraints in the 
Operations and Support phase of the 
Defense Acquisition Management System 




ChBA can be executed using Broad 
Agency Announcements (BAAs), 
Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite 
Quantity (ID/IQ) contracts, Single 
Awards, Blanket Purchase Agreements 
(BPAs), or Multi-Award Contracts 
(MACs).  
ChBA can employ a flexible, streamlined 
contracting process suited to a variety of 
contracting vehicle types. This enables the 
program manager to leverage the 
contracting type that best suits the 




ChBA is structured to encourage a 
diverse range of industry members 
(including nontraditional defense 
suppliers), to participate, thus making 
for a highly competitive environment. 
Because ChBA lowers market entry 
barriers to nontraditional DoD suppliers, it 
provides enhanced opportunities for 
competition that may not normally arise 
within the traditional defense marketplace. 
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 maximizing the use of commercial products and services; 
 using contractors who have a track record of successful past performance or 
who demonstrate a current superior ability to perform;  
 promoting competition; 
 minimizing administrative operating costs; 
 conducting business with integrity, fairness, and openness; and  
 fulfilling public policy objectives. 
FAR Part 2.101, Definitions, includes the following provision: “Qualification 
requirement means a Government requirement for testing or other quality assurance 
demonstration that must be completed before award of a contract.” The FAR and the 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) contain regulatory and policy 
guidance to allow testing of designs before implementation and fielding. FAR 11.801, Pre-
award in-use evaluation, states that “supplies may be evaluated under comparable in-use 
conditions without a further test plan, provided offerors are so advised in the solicitation. The 
results of such tests or demonstrations may be used to rate the proposal, to determine 
technical acceptability, or otherwise to evaluate the proposal.” 
DoD Directive 5000.01 (DoD, 2003a) requires each military department to establish 
its own independent Operational Test Agency (OTA) to plan and conduct operational tests, 
report results, and provide evaluations for effectiveness and suitability. DoDD 5000.01 
(DoD, 2003a) further requires the integration of test and evaluation throughout the defense 
acquisition process. DoD Instruction 5000.02 (DoD, 2008), issued in 2008, requires a 
Materiel Development Decision prior to a program’s entry into the acquisition process, 
causing program offices to invest more funds to mitigate technical risk. Such requirements 
support the use of ChBA as a means to improve testing efficiency and effectiveness across 
DoD OTAs (DoD, 2003a). 
The examples described previously show that acquisition law and regulation already 
allow demonstration testing to ensure contractor performance. Precedents in which the 
government has successfully applied ChBA techniques to acquisitions exist in several 
domains, such as IT and space. Thus, applying ChBA-like methods to satisfy critical needs 
appears both legal and practical. 
An initial review of acquisition regulation and policy reveals when and how ChBA 
may be best applied. 
 Research and development: A Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) 
procedure provides a competitive acquisition process. If the challenge 
involves seeking innovative solutions, then it almost certainly falls within the 
area of early exploration or development.  
 Components, sub-systems, or items: The smaller an acquisition, the easier it 
is to adapt to the acquisition process without the multi-layered FAR (2013) or 
DoD Instruction 5000.02 (DoD, 2008) provisions or constraints. 
 Urgent capability: Field commanders who require rapid action express their 
urgent wartime needs in Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements or 
similar documents. These needs are often very specific and amenable to 
description as acquisition challenges. 
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 Short life cycle: Technology-intensive acquisitions are likely to be short lived 
given the rapid pace of technology evolution. This makes the complex 
guidance regarding the importance of reducing long life-cycle costs during the 
Operations and Support phase of the Defense Acquisition Management 
process essentially irrelevant. 
Better Buying Power 2.0  
Recent DoD guidance has also emphasized a faster approach to adopting solutions 
by using rapid acquisition or agile techniques. In his “Better Buying Power” memorandum 
(USD[AT&L], 2010), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics recognized the need to make DoD acquisitions more affordable through added 
investment at the beginning of the acquisition process to ensure a cost-competitive result. 
The Defense Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0 initiative (USD[AT&L], 2012) covers several 
areas in which challenges can be well suited to implement current guidance. 
Achieve Affordable Programs 
Mandate Affordability. Challenges can be used to mandate affordability by 
requiring that all solutions meet a specific price target as a condition of participation in the 
challenge and subsequent procurement. For example, a challenge may specify that the 
chosen solution shall not cost more than X dollars. Challenge participants may automatically 
become ineligible for a final contract award unless their solutions meet the unit cost and/or 
total cost requirements. This approach ensures that all solutions that the government 
procures using ChBA will meet pre-defined program affordability targets. 
Reduce Program Cost and Risk. The government can use challenges to reduce 
risk through “actual” demonstrated performance before the government commits itself to a 
long-term contract. Furthermore, the DoD can build testing and certification criteria into the 
challenge event, thereby ensuring that accepted solutions will meet testing requirements 
and required performance objectives before they are purchased by the government, thus 
reducing risk, delivery timelines, and cost. 
Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry 
Incorporate Innovation Into Production at a More Rapid Rate. Challenges can 
spur industry productivity by guiding efficient application of research and development 
resources to meet specific requirements for a concrete capability. Furthermore, because the 
technology purchased must be nearly production ready at the time the challenge takes 
place, this mechanism provides an additional incentive for industry to establish an efficient 
production process that drives down costs and promotes efficiency. 
Promote Effective Competition 
Emphasize Competition Strategies and Create/Maintain Competitive 
Environments. ChBA directly supports creation of a competitive acquisition environment 
because it encourages a wide range of solution providers to participate. Challenges must be 
open to the greatest possible number of potential participants, since traditional requirements 
for entering the defense market do not apply in the ChBA environment. For example, in a 
challenge focused on current performance requirements, previous experience may be 
irrelevant when it comes time to make a contract award. This key difference enables 
organizations and even individuals who have little/no defense experience to participate, thus 
enlarging the competitive landscape. 
Enforce Open Systems Architectures and Manage Technical Data Rights. The 
DoD can also use challenges effectively to support the introduction of open system 
architectures (OSAs) across the DoD. OSAs require a predefined architecture with open 
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interfaces for easy integration of components (DoD, 2011). Challenges can be used to 
develop adaptable technology for key components of open systems. ChBA also permits 
flexible intellectual property arrangements and opportunities for licensing negotiations that 
support effective management of technical data rights over the program life cycle.  
Roles and Responsibilities  
Government Role  
The government takes on a new role in ChBA. In traditional acquisition, the 
government communicates its needs in a specification and must assume that fulfillment of 
the specification equates to meeting mission needs. However, the specification could be 
appropriately constrained, under constrained, over constrained, or simply wrong. If the 
specification is under constrained or wrong, the result is unlikely to meet mission 
requirements. If the specification is over constrained, the solution will likely not be optimal 
and might be impossible to implement.  
Current incentives encourage contractors to propose solutions to meet over-
constrained specifications, even if the constraints create a high risk of failure and, in the 
process, spend large amounts of money on developing solutions that may never be fully 
realized. The fundamental flaw in this process is the failure to recognize when over-
specifying drives design. To avoid these problems and implement ChBA successfully, the 
government should consider the following: 
Decompose Complex Requirements Into Challenges. The government will need 
to interpret warfighter requirements and translate them into meaningful challenge events 
that will give industry the latitude for innovation and get users what they need. This requires 
the government to have a broad vision and a commitment to success beyond that typically 
needed to issue requests for proposals or BAAs. Furthermore, the government should 
ensure that technical details are not over specified, but rather generalized into technology-
agnostic capability requirements that can be demonstrated in a challenge.  
Generalize User Experience and Needs and Communicate Them to Industry. 
After gathering requirements from the warfighter and translating them into executable 
challenges, the government should communicate the scope of the challenges to industry. In 
doing so, the government admittedly assumes risk, because formulating the challenges 
requires the ability to interpret and translate warfighter experience and needs in a clear and 
concise manner, thus enabling industry to execute the challenge.  
Find Unclassified Analogues to Classified Situations. The government should 
employ ChBA to identify possible solutions to classified requirements by utilizing 
unclassified challenge analogues. In these situations, participants may not know the details 
of the particular setting in which the government plans to use a solution, and instead would 
only know the general performance objectives to be met. This approach supports an 
enhanced competitive environment by enabling those vendors that do not possess the 
required security clearances and facilities to participate in the challenge.  
Design and Execute a Concrete Challenge Apparatus. The government should 
design challenge-specific execution and evaluation processes that include a plan for 
communicating challenges to industry, a plan detailing how the challenge will be executed 
contractually, specific requirements for challenge participation, and detailed evaluation 
criteria to ensure the challenge evaluation will be fair to all participants. 
Perform Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Challenge Results. The 
government should use quantitative and qualitative measurements to evaluate challenge 
results. More specifically, the government may evaluate the challenge participants during or 
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immediately after the challenge, and/or over a longer term, as defined by the initial 
challenge notice. Upon completion of the challenge, the government may opt to  
 Purchase one or more of the competitors’ offerings based on confidence in 
the product’s utility, as demonstrated during the challenge. 
 Refine and reissue the challenge based on lessons learned during challenge 
performance. This can become part of an incremental government strategy 
that includes challenge-based research projects.  
 Do nothing. If the challenge results did not inspire confidence that any of the 
products would meet government needs, the government has no obligation to 
let a contract. This prevents a potentially unsuccessful acquisition. 
Industry Role  
Industry also takes on a new role in ChBA: one that more closely mirrors how 
industry normally develops and brings a product to the commercial market versus the 
traditional defense acquisition market. In this case, industry would be responsible for 
independently developing a solution that addresses a given capability need (e.g., “get to my 
destination faster and with comfort and affordability”). This approach contrasts starkly with 
the traditional defense acquisition process whereby the government provides detailed 
specifications and requirements (e.g., faster horses) to industry. In the former case, industry 
bears most of the risk, while in the latter case the risk is borne by the government. Thus, in 
support of ChBA, industry should do the following:  
Innovate. ChBA will demand that industry propose innovative solutions. ChBA is by 
definition technology agnostic—it does not presuppose one specific, ideal technological 
solution. Consequently, government will not prescribe a specific technological path that 
industry must follow, but rather will present its requirements in the form of general challenge 
objectives that must be met. Industry must then apply its expertise to determine the best 
technical approach to address the objectives within the schedule/cost constraints provided 
by the government.  
Cooperate With Traditional/Non-Traditional Entities. No single company has a 
monopoly on innovative solutions. ChBA acquisition, by its very definition, seeks the best 
technology to address the military’s toughest problems. Therefore, industry must be willing 
to cooperate with any individual or organization that could contribute to a solution meeting 
challenge performance criteria.  
Dedicate R&D Funding. ChBA will require that industry dedicate IR&D funding to 
develop a solution that meets challenge performance criteria. While the government may 
choose to provide nominal funding to enable organizations to attend and participate in 
challenge events, it may not necessarily fund any of the initial development effort. 
Negotiate Intellectual Property Licenses. ChBA will require that industry be 
prepared to negotiate potential intellectual property licenses with the government. As a 
result, it is important that industry properly identify which of its solutions it derived through 
exclusive use of IR&D funding versus those that may have been developed at partial or full 
government expense. Such a distinction is important, because the source of funding dictates 
the type of licensing rights available to the government. 
ChBA Within Defense Acquisition  
ChBA is well suited to smaller acquisitions, which are usually not controlled by the 
full DoD Instruction 5000.02 (DoD, 2008) guidance. In large acquisitions, ChBA can 
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enhance the standard process by efficiently providing many of the 5000.02-specified 
components, if not necessarily the entire solution.  
Since ChBA is grounded in requirements development and the acquisition process, it 
does not represent a radical or disruptive break with accepted practice. Instead, it 
generalizes and builds on existing concepts such as the Defense Acquisition Management 
System (DAMS), which guides the procurement of major military systems. Figure 1 provides 
a graphical view of the DAMS phases. 
 
 DAMS Phases 
The DAMS recognizes the need for an evolutionary approach to acquisition, stating 
that “an evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments, recognizing, up front, the 
need for future capability improvements” (DAU, 2011). Increments are managed through 
repeated application of the Technology Development and Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development phases. ChBA applies in these early phases of the DAMS and in the general 
evolutionary approach. Specific opportunities for ChBA application within the DAMS are 
further described in Table 2. 
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 DAMS and ChBA 
 
The ChBA Process 
Figure 2 shows the flow of a hypothetical challenge-based acquisition. The process 
begins when the government becomes aware of a user’s need. The acquiring agency, or its 
DAMS Phase Applicability of ChBA 
Materiel Solution Analysis—Assess potential 
materiel solutions and perform an Analysis of 
Alternatives. This phase begins when an Initial 
Capabilities Document is approved that contains 
an analysis of current mission performance and 
potential concepts from across the DoD. It ends 
when the Analysis of Alternatives is complete and 
materiel solution options, identified in the Initial 
Capabilities Document, are recommended. 
The Analysis of Alternatives enumerates the critical 
elements needed by each proposed materiel solution. 
ChBA supplements this step because industry provides 
the technology needed to create a capability prior to 
participation in the challenge. If the government does 
become involved in selecting and maturing technologies, 
a challenge, based on the needed capability, could be 
used to explore the range of candidate technologies and 
assess their maturity. 
Technology Development—Determine and mature 
the appropriate technologies needed for the full 
system. Critical technology elements, identified in 
the previous phase, must be demonstrated using 
prototypes. The Technology Development phase 
requires the creation of a Technology 
Development Strategy. For an evolutionary 
acquisition, the Technology Development Strategy 
is to include a preliminary description of how the 
materiel solution will be divided into acquisition 
increments based on mature technology and an 
appropriate limitation on the number of prototype 
units. 
A ChBA approach to the Technology Development 
Strategy is to design a challenge that proves the maturity 
of each needed technology. The challenge may or may 
not require a prototype, but will place emphasis on 
attainment of the technological capability rather than the 
delivery of a prototype. The acquisition increment 
requirement of the Technology Development Strategy 
can be served by a standing challenge that persists 
through time as multiple challengers demonstrate a 
range of solutions. A standing challenge gives industry a 
chance to improve on existing solutions. It also 
encourages the discovery of game-changing solutions to 
challenges that have already been solved with more 
pedestrian technologies. 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development—
Develop the full system or some increment of the 
full system capability. This includes full system 
integration and creation of an affordable and 
executable manufacturing process. 
ChBA potentially eliminates the need for this phase 
because the technology needed to create a capability is 
already at or near full capability as a prerequisite for 
challenge participation. Further, the challenge may 
specifically require that participants (or their partners) 
produce fully operational versions of the submissions by 
a certain point in time following the challenge event.  
Production and Deployment—Achieve an 
operational capability that satisfies mission needs. 
This includes low rate production for evaluation of 
major systems and full production or 
procurement of smaller systems. 
Technology acquired using ChBA is by definition nearly 
production ready; therefore, ChBA can be used to 
accelerate the LRIP portion of the acquisition process. 
Furthermore, if operational testing and evaluation 
criteria are already built into the challenge construct, 
technology will have met T&E requirements before the 
government makes a buy decision—again accelerating 
the IOT&E part of the acquisition process. 
Operations and Support—Execute a support 
program that meets readiness and operational 
requirements and sustains the system, in a cost-
effective manner, over its total life cycle. This 
phase also includes disposal of the system at the 
end of its life.  
Challenges can be designed to ensure that operations and 
support requirements are built in from the beginning. As 
such, a challenge-based demonstration can reenact 
operational requirements for readiness and sustainment 
to demonstrate capability before the government makes 
a commitment to purchase. 
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technical support organization, postulates a capability that can satisfy the user’s need. This 
is a creative process and requires more technical insight than simply recording what the 
user has requested. 
With a desired capability in mind, the government agency creates a set of concrete 
performance challenges that would demonstrate the ability of the envisioned capability to 
solve the user’s problem. For example, the user problem could be that soldiers need better 
situational awareness when fighting in urban areas. The envisioned capability could be an 
information sharing mechanism. A supporting challenge might be to show that solders who 
use the candidate challenge solution earn better scores in urban combat training than those 
who do not use the solution. 
 
 ChBA Process  
The challenge event can range from large, periodic, public occasions to private, one-
time visits to a testing laboratory.  
At Arrow C in Figure 2, industry decides to attempt the challenge. This may produce 
two results: 
 Increased government knowledge of potential solutions and their vendors, 
depicted by Arrow D. 
 Greater understanding of the trade space in which a solution might be found. 
Arrows E and F show that this understanding comes from both observed 
performance in the challenge event and information available about 
promising vendors and their products. 
Arrows G and H show that ChBA can be a cyclic process. 
 Competitors whose product failed in one challenge may make another 
attempt after modifying their products. The government may also take this 
opportunity to fund promising vendors directly. Direct funding rewards 
vendors for their initiative and incentivizes them to attempt the challenge 
again, as depicted by Arrow G. 
 Based on improved knowledge of the needed capability and the technical 
trade space, the government can revise the challenge and begin the process 
again, as depicted by Arrow H. This can be important during the acquisition of 
complex systems, where multiple steps may be needed to state the challenge 
correctly or arrive at the appropriate technology. 
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Case Study—Joint IED Defeat Organization 
The mission of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO, n.d.-b) is to “reduce the 
effectiveness and lethality of IEDs, to allow freedom of maneuver for joint forces, federal 
agencies, and partner nations in current and future operating environments” (JIEDDO, n.d.-
a). In its strategic plan, JIEDDO identifies as one of its enduring capabilities the ability to 
“employ authorities, flexible resources, streamlined processes, and effective oversight to 
drive the research and development community to rapidly field C-IED solutions” (JIEDDO, 
n.d.-a). The computer screen saver depicted in Figure 3 carries JIEDDO’s fundamental 
message to the staff every day. This intensity of purpose and need for rapid action make 
JIEDDO well suited to apply ChBA. 
 
 JIEDDO Organization-Wide Computer Screen Saver 
In the summer of 2011, JIEDDO faced the sudden need for a particular class of robot 
in the war in Afghanistan. JIEDDO demonstrated strength and resolve by issuing concrete 
challenges that communicated the soldiers’ needs rather than reading vendor literature and 
attending presentations. The challenges were drawn from the suite of Response Robot 
Performance Standards (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011) developed 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST; www.nist.gov). The NIST test 
method suite includes a range of mobility and duration assessment devices that provide 
excellent models of the challenges robots face in Afghanistan. 
Six vendors accepted the challenge and at their own expense brought their robots to 
NIST for assessment. Some robots met the challenges as their vendors claimed. Other 
systems displayed large gaps between promised capability and demonstrated performance. 
JIEDDO then presented the results of the challenges and the concrete characteristics of the 
robots to field users in Afghanistan.  
JIEDDO discovered that the original request from the field had been over 
constrained. The challenge performance helped the users to understand the performance 
trade space and to recognize that one class of robot alone would not meet their needs. As a 
result, JIEDDO identified two classes of robot that addressed the concerns of two distinct 
user communities—an important distinction nowhere to be found in the original field request. 
In addition to clarifying what the users really needed, the challenge process 
encouraged vendors to improve their products before the government committed itself to a 
purchase. The challenge brought transparency and mutual vendor visibility, sparking 
beneficial competition and product improvement. Within months, vendors asked to return to 
the NIST, again at their own expense, for another opportunity to confront the challenges and 
improve JIEDDO’s perception of their products’ quality. In this way, ChBA enabled JIEDDO 
to go from the initial request for help to fielded systems in less than a year. 
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Barriers to implementation are rooted in the possibility that the government will 
attempt to manage ChBA in the same way it manages a traditional technology acquisition. 
While ChBA leverages the DAMS and supporting processes, the acquisition pitfalls that 
plague these traditional systems could equally undermine ChBA. 
 Acquisition Attributes and Implications for ChBA 
 
Adopting ChBA  
In order for the DoD to adopt and universally implement ChBA across the broader 
defense enterprise, we recommend that the DoD do the following: 
 Educate acquisition professionals about ChBA. There is a gap between 
the latitude allowed by current acquisition law and the state of acquisition 
practice. Briefly stated, the defense acquisition community culture tends to be 
highly risk averse even when there are logical arguments to take on 
additional risk. This cultural dynamic is reinforced as program managers 
regularly spend money to reduce uncertainty (e.g., risk; Frick, 2010, p. 364). 
ChBA enables the government to explore potentially high-risk/high-reward 
solutions in a low-risk environment before vast resources are dedicated to an 
acquisition effort. This suggests that the acquisition corps needs to be 
educated on the value of using ChBA in these circumstances.  
 Publicize examples of ChBA success. The government should publicize 
working examples of ChBA within the acquisition and supporting professional 
communities. Acquisition professionals will feel more comfortable embracing 
ChBA if they can point to other successful programs that use ChBA 
strategies. Senior leadership must be convinced of ChBA utility so that they 
will commission a few early adopter programs, and the managers of these 
early adopter programs must operate under senior leadership imprimatur and 
Typical Acquisition Pitfalls ChBA Implications 
Mission needs are incorrectly translated through the 
daisy chain of performance-related documentation, 
resulting in wrongly defined system performance that 
is over specified, driving non-optimal solutions.  
The DoD may not be able to acquire the most 
innovative solutions from industry using ChBA if the 
government dictates specific requirements instead of 
describing generic capabilities to be demonstrated at a 
challenge event. 
The competitive nature of funding motivates the 
government to make optimistic predictions of system 
performance in order to obtain program approval. 
Likewise, industry is incentivized to propose risky 
solutions, since this can lead to long-term lock-in and 
opportunities for contract modifications to address 
product shortcomings. 
ChBA fundamentally does not permit either the 
government or industry to over-promise system 
performance. Performance must be proven in a 
transparent manner prior to the buy decision.  
The government often approaches acquisition in a risk-
averse manner, requiring extended periods of risk 
reduction accompanied by documentation requiring 
multiple reviews. Regardless of risk-reduction efforts, 
real risk to the government buyer exists due to the late 
conduct of the Operational Evaluation. 
ChBA addresses these risks up front and is ideally 
suited to high-risk technological solutions. However, 
ChBA will require cooperation from current document 
owners and the Operational Test community to avoid 
this pitfall. 
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protection. The success of the early adopters will then encourage more 
cautious program managers to follow suit, provided the results of ChBA are 
widely publicized across the DoD.  
 Develop a ChBA desk guide as a reference for acquisition 
professionals. The DoD should produce a ChBA desk guide to support use 
of ChBA across the defense enterprise. The guide should be patterned after 
existing acquisition desk guides to answer day-to-day questions and provide 
example solutions, practices, and business cases related to ChBA. As ChBA 
is more widely adopted across the DoD, the desk guide should be updated 
periodically to document new lessons learned, case studies, and best 
practices.  
 Consider legislative and regulatory change. Amend the FAR and revise 
current acquisition guidance to reflect ChBA as an accepted method to 
acquire capability for the warfighter. Explicit acceptance of ChBA in published 
regulatory and policy documents will codify the approach and bring 
recognition that it represents a sound way of doing business and can achieve 
high impact in performance improvement.  
Conclusion 
ChBA can solve a class of acquisition problems defined by industry’s tolerance of 
capital risk and the government’s ability to express user needs in terms of concrete 
challenges. It thus constitutes a logical next step in the current wave of acquisition reforms. 
ChBA has proven itself in the world of civilian advanced technology acquisition and has 
been demonstrated successfully in limited areas within the DoD.  
Successful application of ChBA demands a renewed government commitment to 
technical involvement in acquisition, calling upon the acquisition agent to create challenges 
that, if fulfilled, would also meet the user’s requirements. This requires a clear understanding 
of user need, as well as the creativity, imagination, and technical insight necessary to design 
the challenge.  
ChBA encourages the best performance in industry by freeing companies from 
constraints unrelated to challenge success. It encourages new players to participate and 
creates a level playing field for all involved. ChBA adheres to government regulations and is 
practical to use within the current federal acquisition system. Above all, it offers an efficient 
means for stimulating industrial innovation and reducing the time and cost of government 
acquisition programs. 
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